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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
AND THE SOCIAL WORKER
REV. ANTHONY

C

F.

LOGATTO*

of a confidential and intimate nature, while posing
of
evidence, as to law, ethics, and professions, are
many problems
of particular concern to the social work profession. The profession, with
minor exceptions, enjoys no immunity in the law. It is not protected by
the precious right known as privileged communication. The problem, in
essence, is this: social work rests upon relationship between worker and
client, and an essential element of this relationship is confidentiality. The
worker, on the one hand receives from the client a type of information
which a person bares only to a confessor, a physician or a lawyer. On
the other hand, he must be alert to the fact that in an unusual case he
may be called upon to reveal this information which the client gives in
all good faith, implicitly believing that whatever is said is sacred, as it
were, and incommunicable. Early in the history of the profession, its
first authoritative spokesman, Mary E. Richmond, wrote that "in the
whole range of professional contacts there is no more confidential relation than that which exists between the social worker and the person or
family receiving treatment."' Dr. McGuinn even more concretely characterizes the relationship in these apt words: "The social worker touches
human life more intimately in many ways than the doctor or the lawyer.
He enters the sanctum of the home, listens to confidences almost too
sacred for utterance and the presumption is clearer than the sun that the
person who confides this information expects the social worker to protect
'2
it; especially from those channels where it would be used against him.
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And yet the law to date offers no solution
to the dilemma, leaving the social worker
in a conflict between adherence to the law
and fidelity to a trust. "He finds himself in
the seemingly anomalous position of being
obliged to reveal the very confidences
which his professional status commands
him to preserve. ' 3
Legal Survey
Since social work emerged as a profession only with the turn of the century, its
legal history is not so replete as the venerable histories of other professions traditionally enjoying privileged communication. 4 Only as recently as 1930 does there
appear what seems to be the earliest case
specifically ruling on the issue of privileged
communication as related to the social
work profession. 5 In this case a social
agency asserted the privilege as a defense
against producing case records in court.
The court sustained the privilege. But in a
subsequent case, occurring shortly thereafter, in the same court, with another justice presiding, the defense was struck down
with the comment that: "Nothing is so confidential as to prevent bringing to light the
facts in any case. I appreciate the stand
taken, but in the absence of a statutory
prohibition the application must be
granted." 6
As to the degree of protection afforded
by statutory prohibitions, these appear
3 McGuinn, The Professional Secret in Social
Work, 1 BOSTON COLLEGE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
WORK STUDIES 1, 2 (1938).
4 See 14 ENCYC. Soc. Sci. Social Work 165-73

(1934).
Perlman v. Perlman, Index No. 5105, N. Y.
Sup. Ct., Bronx County, June 30, 1930.
6 In the Matter of the City of New York (Sup.
Ct., Bronx County), 91 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1934,
p. 529, col. 7.
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more in shreds than in full statutes. Section
155 of the old Public Welfare Law of New
York provided that all communications
and information, relating to a person receiving relief or service, obtained by any
public welfare official or employee in the
course of his work shall be considered
confidential and shall be disclosed only
to the state board of social welfare, or its
authorized representative, a legislative
body, or, by authority of the Commissioner,
to a person or agency considered by the
Commissioner entitled to such information. 7 But in the case of People v. Feurnstein,8 the defendant, found guilty of perjury, moved to dismiss the indictment,
relying on Section 155 of the Public Welfare Law, on the ground that the evidence
was illegally obtained from the records of
the Home Relief Bureau. The court denied
the motion on the theory that a beneficiary
of a governmental agency waived confidentiality when he publicly revealed his
relationship with that agency. The court
also ruled, as a second ground, that the
statute made disclosure discretionary rather
than prohibiting it absolutely. 9 In another
7 The present statute, Section 136(2) of the New
York Social Welfare Law, reads: "All communications and information relating to a person receiving public assistance or care obtained by any
public welfare official, service officer, or employee
in the course of his work shall be considered confidential and, except as otherwise provided in this
section, shall be disclosed only to the state board
of social welfare or its authorized representative,
the county board of supervisors, city council, town
board or other board or body authorized and
required to appropriate funds for public assistance
and care in and for such county, city or town or
its authorized representative or, by authority of
the county, city or town public welfare official, to
a person or agency considered entitled to such
information."
8 161 Misc. 426, 293 N.Y. Supp. 239 (Queens
County Ct. 1936).
9 Ibid.
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case, however, the petition on the part of
a private citizen for an order to examine
welfare records was refused.' 0 The court
pointed to the same provision of the Public Welfare Law holding such records
confidential. Then, addressing itself to the
motive of the petitioner, the court observed
that the statutes contained adequate safeguards against improprieties in the distribution of funds for public relief, and, the
court added, "it does not appear that the
public interest requires that the records of
the Commissioner of Public Welfare be
disclosed to any taxpayer who may wish to
examine them for whatever purpose."'"
The limited degree of privilege is reflected in similar statutes throughout various jurisdictions. A Kentucky statute
provides that all information received by
probation or parole officers in the course
of duty cannot be used as evidence in
court, or disclosed to other than a judge or
officer of the department unless otherwise
ordered by the judge or department. 12 The
records of 'adoption are usually granted
some privacy. A Maine statute provides
that all probate of records dealing with
adoption are confidential and may be examined only upon the authorization of a
judge of a probate court.'2 A refinement
of the language appears in the Alaska
statute providing that the records of those
receiving public assistance may not be
used for other than official business, i.e.,
10 Coopersberg

v. Taylor, 148 Misc. 824, 266
N.Y. Supp. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
11 Id. at 825, 266 N.Y. Supp. at 360. Also, an

not for commercial purposes or publication
14
in newspapers.
The federal government, which traditionally left most welfare and health matters to the states, with the outset of the
great depression of the thirties, stepped
into these areas, more and more deeply to
the extent that today the federal government is virtually a partner in most of the
health and welfare programs within the
states, whether under public or private
auspices.' Much, if not most, of the federal
participation finds justification in the Social
Security Act. One author characterizes that
act as "the first effort by the federal government to afford legal protection against
disclosure to the confidences entrusted by
its citizens to social workers."' 1 The act
makes mandatory, on all states receiving
federal funds as grants-in-aid, the inclusion
of a confidentiality clause in their own enabling statutes. Thus section 2 reads, in
part: "A State plan for old-age assistance
must . . . provide safeguards which restrict the use or disclosure of information
concerning applicants and recipients to
purposes directly connected with the administration of old-age assistance ...
.
Similar provisions apply to aid to dependent
children,' 8 aid to the blind,' 9 the perma-

COMP. LAWS ANN. § 51-1-3 (1949).
"5"In the 1930's the United States government
14 ALASKA

began to demonstrate that it considered one of its
functions and obligations to be the enrichment
and protection of family life and individual life."
ALVES,

CONFIDENTIALITY

IN

SOCIAL

WORK

80

(1959).
15, at 79.
17 Social Security Act §2(a)(8), 53 Stat. 1360
(1939), 42 U.S.C. §302(a)(8) (1958).

opinion of the Attorney General of New York
State holds that the confidentiality of records applies not only to those who received assistance but

16 ALVES, op. cit. supra note

also to those who made application for relief. See
57 Ops. ATT'y GEN. 164-66 (1936).
2
1 Ky.REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.220 (1955).
3
l ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 158, §39 (1954).

18 Social Security Act § 402 (a) (8), 53 Stat. 1379

(1939), 42 U.S.C. §602(a)(8) (1958).
19 Social Security Act § 1002(a) (9), 53 Stat. 1397
(1939), 42 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(9) (1958).
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nently and totally disabled, 20 etc. 21 It is the
firm conviction of the social work profession that such provisions protect
needy persons against identification as a special group segregated on the basis of their
need alone, and prevents their exploitation
for commercial, personal, or political purposes. It also protects their civil liberties by
prohibiting the use of such information as
a basis for prosecution and other court proceedings except in connection with the en-

22
forcement of the public assistance laws.

How well this worked in practice, however,
is seen in what follows.
An action by an insurance company
against their insured to void a policy on
the grounds of falsification of age rested
on proof of age secured from the county
public welfare records. 23 Over the objections of the insured that such records were
privileged and hence inadmissible except
for purposes directly connected with the
administration of pensions, as provided in
the state statute, the court held the records
admissible. The court stated that only
voluntary disclosures by employees of the
welfare department were forbidden, and
that the law was not intended to preclude
20

Social Security Act § 1402(a)(9), 64 Stat. 555
(1950), 42 U.S.C. § 1352(a)(9) (1958).
21 Some authorities feel that these statutes are
merely in line with similar statutes already existing whereby access to the records of tax authorities, regulatory and fact-finding agencies of
government is discretionary with the proper authorities. Others feel rather that "the thinking
which culminated in the above amendments to the
Social Security Act, making public welfare records
confidential, stemmed more from the fact that the
federal government had actually entered the professional field." ALVES, op. cit. supra 'note 15,
at 80.
22 Martz, The Contributionof Social Work to the
Administration of Public Assistance, 37 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 55 (1956).
23 Bell v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 327 I11. App.

321, 64 N.E.2d 204 (1945).
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the courts from the records when the court
found them pertinent to a legal inquiry.
24
In State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe,
the administrator of a county welfare department petitioned the Supreme Court of
Washington for a writ of certiorari to review the order of a judge of the juvenile
court to produce all case records relating to
a juvenile before the court in an adjudication of delinquency proceedings. The
agency administrator appeared in court
without the case records but with a summary of the case records containing such
facts as the administrator thought pertinent.
The administrator relied on Rule 8 of the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
State of Washington, Department of Social
Security, which is very specific and entitled
"Prohibition against Release of Confidential
Information in Court Action." The section
reads:
No employee or representative of the department shall release any confidential
information concerning public assistance
applicants or recipients either by written records or oral testimony in any court proceeding, except where such proceeding involves
the administration of the public assistance
program. In the event that any employee or
representative of the department or any record of the department is subpoenaed, the
representative of the department shall answer the subpoena and shall in court plead
the regulation and the law safeguarding public assistance informahtion as the basis for
withholding such information from disclosure in court.
The juvenile court judge turned aside the
administration's summary and ordered the
case records themselves to be submitted. He
gave the following reasons: (1) in a prior
summary submitted by the welfare department substantial errors of fact were in24 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946).

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

cluded and the conclusions drawn therefrom were inadequate; (2) summaries which
do not include sources of information leave
the court in the dark as to how to evaluate
the worker's opinion; (3) summaries take
time, records are available at once; (4)
finally, untrained workers draw up the summaries and hence they are of dubious
value. 25 In upholding the order of the juvenile court the supreme court added that it
was not the intent of the Social Security
Act, or of the state legislation cited, that
they be applied to the juvenile court, since
the statute "makes adequate provision not
only for private hearings in such matters,
but also for the withholding of all reports
in such cases from public inspection and
for their destruction. '2 The court observed
that the secrecy of such records "will as
wholeheartedly be respected and as sedulously be preserved by the juvenile court
as it will be by the officers of the welfare
'
department. "27
As to the possibility of losing the federal
grant-in-aid because of the apparent breach
of the provisions as to confidentiality, 28 the
court dismissed this line of reasoning:
[N]or do we believe that any Federal board,
acquainted with the manner in which juveSee State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wash.
169 P.2d 706, 708 (1946).
2d 161. -.
26 Id. at -,
169 P.2d at 711.
27 Id. at __, 169 P.2d at 711.
25

See Social Security Act § 404, 49 Stat. 628
(1935). 42 U.S.C. §604 (1958), which states:
"In the case of any State plan for aid to dependent
children which has been approved by the Secretary, if the Secretary after reasonable notice and
opportunity for hearing to the State agency . . .
2s

finds . . . that in the administration of the plan

there is a failure to comply substantially with any
provision required by section 402(a) to be included in the plan; the Secretary shall notify such
State agency that further payments will not be
made to the State until the Secretary is satisfied
... there is no longer any such failure to comply."

nile hearings are conducted in this state and
the ends which they are earnestly seeking to
accomplish, will arbitrarily or peremptorily
terminate itsobligations to furnish public
assistance within this jurisdiction simply because the juvenile courts are given access to
the records of the county welfare department for judicial inspection and use in matters vitally affecting those for whom such
29
public assistance is required.
A much deeper invasion into the privacy
of agency records occurred in the case of
State ex rel. State v. Church30 where the Supreme Court of the State of Washington
affirmed the lower court's order that the administrator of the county welfare department produce the department's records at
a criminal trial. The appellate court recognized the intent of the welfare department
rule to restrict disclosure of records except
for purposes directly related to administration of the public assistance program, but
observed, in the language of the Haugland
case: "It is significant that this provision
of the rules and regulations does not command or suggest that the officer thus subpoenaed shall in all events disobey any
order of the court relative to the production of such records and the disclosure of
information contained therein, but only
prescribes that the officer shall by proper
plea inform the court of the existence and
prohibitive requirement of the rules." 31 The
strong objection of counsel that this was a
criminal trial and a matter of public record
and therefore to be distinguished from the
Haugland case was not persuasive; neither
was the able description by counsel of the
dire effects this court's ruling could have
29 State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, supra note 25,

at

169 P.2d at 711.
Wash. 2d 170, 211 P.2d 701 (1949).
31 State ex rel. State v. Church, 35 Wash. 2d 170,
- 211 P.2d 701, 703 (1949).
__

30 35
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on the entire administration of the public
assistance programs throughout the coun32
try.
But this was not the end of the road: By
1951, three states, in response to public
agitation about "chiselers" on relief rolls,
enacted changes in their assistance laws
permitting the names of assistance recipients to be made known to the public on
the theory that this would shame some
recipients off the rolls and deter others
from trying to get on.3 3 To authorize these

changes ift
state laws enough pressure was
exercised in Congress to amend the Social
Security Act by incorporating into the General Revenue Act of 1951 a rider with an
anti-confidentiality clause. The amendment
reads: "No State or any agency or political
division thereof shall be deprived of any
grant-in-aid or other payment to which it
otherwise is or has become entitled pursuant to Title I, IV, X, or XIV of the
Social Security Act, as amended, by reason of the enactment or enforcement by
such State of any legislation prescribing
any conditions under which public access
may be had to records of the disbursement
of any such funds or payments within such
State, if such legislation prohibits the use
of any list or names obtained through
such access to such records for commercial
or political purposes. '3 4 About thirty states
now have laws permitting public inspection
of records concerning persons receiving
federally-aided

public assistance.3 5 It
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made.3 6 In Illinois, the first state to enact
the new legislation, only sixty-two requests
were received during the first six months
after passage' of the law. "The relief rolls
did not decrease or increase as a result of
these new laws." '37 These rather innocuous
results seem to have confused both the proponents and the opponents of the new policy in the law. It must be borne in mind,
however, that the Jenner Amendment, as
it is called, refers only to the fact and the
amount of assistance, and not to other personal information contained in case recas
ords.
In terms of a practical solution many
welfare departments have struck up a relationship of mutual understanding with the
local courts. The experience of a county
welfare department in Illinois might be
typical:
With the tradition of the confidential nature of Juvenile Court records, it was very
easy to carry over the same idea to the new
Bureau of Public Welfare. . . . If the in-

formation requested was not of a confidential nature we have told the courts that the
information was not confidential and that
we would be glad to submit it if the court
wished. In other cases in which there was
any question we have presented the matter
to the courts in somewhat this way

-

'The

Bureau of Public Welfare attempts to work
with persons who are in difficulty, urging
the individual who comes to us for counsel
and assistance to give us all of the facts
regarding his affairs in order that we might
be in a position to act intelligently. If the
individual gives information to us in good
faith, it is not fair to the individual to publish what he has given us.' In every instance
this line of argument has been accepted by

is

interesting to note that only a limited number of requests for inspection have been
Id. at -,211 P.2d at 703-04.
Martz, The Contribution of Social Work to the
Administration of Public Assistance, 37 SOCIAL
CASEWORK 57-58 (1956).
34 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 618, 65 Stat.
569.
35 Martz, supra note 33, at 59.
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32
33

36 Ibid.
37 ALVES, CONFIDENTIALITY IN SOCIAL WORK

(1959).
38

See

ALvEs, op. cit. supra note 37, at 90.

89
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the courts and the confidential nature of the
8 9
records respected.
This is a far cry, however, from the status
of privilege and, in a critical case, the whole
structure might fall upon the unhappy head
of a very unhappy client.
The School Records Controversy
in New York
Casework, psychology, psychiatry, counselling and guidance are separate, yet not
distinct, forms of mental help.40 This paper
is primarily interested in the social work
area and might in broad general terms encompass the areas of casework, counselling and guidance.4 1 But social workers
function closely with psychologists and
psychiatrists, in fact their services are
often housed under the same roof, and in
conjunction with each other in a so-called
"'team," which means that the various approaches converge on a problem to give a
total service to the client at the one time
and in the same place. The plot thickens,
39 Family Welfare Ass'n of America [currently,

Family Service Ass'n of America], Safeguarding
the Confidential Nature of Case Records in Public
Agencies 3 (Jan. 1940).
40 There are no exact and generally accepted definitions of these disciplines having to do with
mental health. The lines of demarcation are general and to some extent over-lapping. In fact, there
is considerable and, it might be added, unresolved,
controversy as to whether or not they are all forms
of therapy. Be that as it may, these areas do have
working definitions, and do not offer too much
difficulty in practice. At any rate, it is not within
the province of this paper to enter this labyrinth
of function and semantics.
41 The writer asks the indulgence of the reader to
accept these generalizations about social work
and the related professions, understanding that
full interpretation and documentation would be
burdensome as well as irrelevant at this time.
These matters are well covered and available in
the standard manuals and periodicals of the professions involved.

however, when it is explained that social
work case records may include materials,
reports and interviews resulting from the
participation of some or of all of these
"team" members. The social work record
is generally the central repository of this
information. There is the additional complication that information, findings, and
other confidential materials are exchanged
between and among the various professional persons and agencies that have
worked with a particular individual or family. This means that psychological and psychiatric records may contain casework reports and, of course, vice-versa. These
introductory remarks set the stage for the
recent school records controversy in New
York and the involvement of social work
therein.
In September of 1960, there occurred
the unexpected release by the New York
State Department of Education of a directive that parents of public school children
be permitted to inspect the records of their
children. These records include, among
other things, progress reports, subject
grades, intelligence quotients, tests, achievement scores and psychological and psychiatric reports. The matter came to light in
a departmental hearing before the Commissioner of the Department of Education,
in which the appellant sought to restrain
the Department of Education from carrying
out its directive. 42 In arriving at his decision the Commissioner acknowledged that
certain records of the kind here involved
are privileged and confidential. Thus Section 7611 of the New York Education Law
provides that "the confidential relations and
communications between a psychologist...
and his client are placed on the same basis
42 In the Matter of Thibadeau, N. Y. Dep't of
Educ., No. 6849, Sept. 22, 1960.
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as those provided by law between attorney
and client, and nothing in this article shall
be construed to require any such privileged
communications to be disclosed." But such
privilege, said the Commissioner, merely
prevents the disclosure of the communication or record to third parties; that is, to
persons other than the client. The client,
continued the Commissioner, "within the
meaning of the provisions referred to is the
child and, since the child is a minor, and
cannot exercise full legal discretion, the
parent or guardian of the child."'43 The
Commissioner held that the parent, as a
matter of law, is entitled to such information; and since there were sufficient safeguards within the procedures provided for
by the Department of Education, the directive was to be followed and the appeal was
dismissed. The safeguard provided for refers back to a particular part of that decision which reads:
It is, of course, to be understood that, at the
time of the inspection of such records by
the parent, appropriate personnel should be
present where necessary to prevent any misinterpretation by the parent of the meaning
of the record, since some of the records here
in question may not be properly evaluated
and understood by some parents. 44
The difficulties of the social worker in
reference to this decision resolve themselves into two. The first is the fact that
social agencies, where necessary and with
proper safeguards, exchange information
among themselves as to their experience
with clients. Since some of this information
is shared with the Department of Education, especially the Bureau of Child Guidance (in the City of New York), it could
very well happen that information divulged
43

Id. at 1.
1-2.

44 Id. at
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by a parent to a social worker in a private
agency at an earlier date might appear
in the records of the Department of Education being reviewed by that same person.
The recognition by a parent of information
in the school records which was confided
to the social worker, could very well shock
the parent and could amount to a destruction of all faith in the confidentiality of
relationship so carefully guarded by the
social worker. This is the primary fear of
the social worker and goes right to the
heart of the matter. Unless people in
trouble, coming to a social agency, can
feel full faith and confidence and implicit
trust in the prudence and integrity of the
worker, this institution of civilized society
would be severely crippled, if not destroyed.
The second fear of the social worker is
that raw data given to parents, unless skillfully interpreted, can be more damaging
than helpful. The safeguards within the Department of Education are perhaps more
illusory than real, since the Department
of Education itself will have to admit that
comparatively few of its personnel are professionally prepared to interpret material
45
of a psychological and psychiatric nature.
In light of the decision, a number of social
service agencies revised their policy so as
to curtail or eliminate completely all reports
of their contacts when the same are requested by the various schools, guidance
46
counsellors, etc.
45 School personnel with clinical experience of a
psychological or psychiatric type are concentrated
mainly in a Bureau of Child Guidance or its equivalent and are out of all proportion numerically to
the vast student body.
46 See, e.g., Letter from Brooklyn Bureau of Social Service and Children's Aid Soc'y to Dr. John
J. Theobold, Superintendent of Schools, Oct. 31,
1960. "[T]his organization is unable to continue
to share its information and findings concerning
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The decision of the Commissioner
brought strong and rapid repercussions,
both favorable and unfavorable. Some parents looked upon these rulings as long
overdue. As expressed by the President of
the United Parents Association: "We believe that the parents have the right to receive an interpretation of their child's test
scores." 47 Others expressed real concern
about the ability of the Department of Education to carry out its interpretative function:
The information [about children] would
have some value if preceded by extensive
parent education. We cannot help wondering how the Board of Education, with its
budgetary problems, can provide appropriate personnel to prevent misinterpretation
48
and misuse of the records.
Dr. Frederick C. McLaughlin, Director of
The Public Education Association, urged
the Board not to comply with the state
ruling, holding that the Association was
"not opposed to the parents receiving as
much information about their children as
would be helpful, but strongly objected to
giving parents the right to see confidential
files and professional reports that may be
' '49
subject to misinterpretation.
Various professional groups expressed
strong views about this ruling of the Department of Education. The New York
State Psychological Association, speaking
through its counsel, said that "very highly
technical psychological data might easily be
misunderstood by an emotional parent." 50
Deep concern as to the impact of the recent
decision had already been registered. Dr.
school pupils or their families with representatives
of the Board of Education."
47 N. Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1960, p. 28, col. 4.
48 Ibid.
Ibid.
50 N. Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1960, p. 23, col. 8.
49

Hansberg, President of the Brooklyn Psychological Association, outlined some of
the problems which should hopefully lead
to a reconsideration and a subsequent rescinding of the rule. 51 While in full agreement that the parent should have as much
information about his child as possible, Dr.
Hansberg pointed out that reports prepared
by professionals are necessarily technicai
in character and if these reports in their
entirety are made available to the parent,
it might, in many cases, result in confusion and undue apprehension. "It is traditional," he said, "in professional practice
that only the interpretation and not the
technical data be communicated to the
layman. ' 52 Numerical test scores and technical detail are dependent in their interpretation upon innumerable subtle and
complex factors particular to the individual
child. The result, he feels, would be that
psychologists, aware of their responsibilities
and profoundly concerned with the welfare
of the child, would tend to submit emasculated reports of very limited value. Dr.
Hansberg appreciated the real concern on
the part of the Department of Education to
provide safeguards against misinterpretation. This, however, represents more "a
laudable wish" than a reality, he felt. He
strongly urged that the ruling be rescinded
53
before irreparable damage could be done.
The Department of Education, undoubtedly perturbed by the potentials of
the situation, issued a "clarification" in
which it confirmed the rights of parents to
see their children's records, but it emphasized that the earlier decisions would "not
mean that isolated bits of numerical data,
51 Letter from Brooklyn Psychological Ass'n to
Dr. James Allen, State Commissioner of Education, October 30, 1960.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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such as, I.Q.'s and achievement scores,
should be presented, bare of interpretation,
to parents, sincefree availability of this type
of information without experience in its application could be less than helpful."' 54 Dr.
Walter Crewson, Associate State Education Commissioner, issued the clarifying
statement, indicating that the Department
recognized the difficulties involved in complying with the decision and that "in the
light of these considerations, the schools
must study carefully and plan for students'
records and for the communication of information to parents."5 5 Dr. John J. Theobald, the New York City Superintendent
of Schools, said that changes would be
made in "records procedures and information procedures," along the lines of the
state order and further stated that steps
would be taken to make sure that pupil
records were carefully explained to parents
to avoid "the danger of promiscuous distribution of information."56
This was the state of affairs, and troubled
indeed, when a very interesting evaluation
of the constitutionality of the Commissioner's directive was made in the Supreme
Court of Nassau County, New York. 57 The
petitioner, on October 28, 1960, made a
formal written demand upon the local public school board that it direct the Superintendent of Schools to make all school
records of his son available for his inspection. On November 2nd, 1960, the demand
54 Clarification of the Thibadeau opinion from Dr.
Walter Crewson, Associate Commissioner of Education, to City, Village and District Superintendents of Schools and Supervising Principals re the
Availability of Pupil Records to Parents, Nov. 21,

1960, p. 2.
55
Id. at 4.
56

N. Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1960, p. 39, col. 2, 3.
57 Van Allen v. McCleary, 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211
N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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was refused. The school board outlined its
policy to keep the parent informed as to
the progress of his child through report
cards, periodic private conferences with
teachers, and, if requested, interpretations,
of the personal file of the child by qualified
school personnel, again by the conference
method. Petitioner, however, in the court's
words "wants not conferences, but the
written records." 58 Whereupon the petitioner brought this action under article 78,
a special proceeding in the nature of mandamus, to compel the Superintendent to
allow the parent to inspect his son's records.
The court made an extensive inquiry into
the parent's rights and the school's obligations in an eleven-page opinion. Attempting to establish whether a clear legal right
to relief was present, the court examined
the New York State Constitution and found
it silent. 9 As for enactments of the legislature, in spite of the fact that McKinney's
Consolidated Laws devotes three volumes
to the Education Law, "there is no legislative pronouncement in this body of statutes
either granting to or taking away from a
parent the right to inspect the school records of his or her child."60 It also emerges
that "neither counsel nor the court has been
able to discover any legislation dealing with
the nature of the school records at issue
here as being either 'public' on the one
hand, or 'confidential' on the other, or of
the right of a parent as distinguished from
the public at large to inspect them." 61 The
court then turned to the regulations, rulings
and orders of the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York. There is no
doubt, said the court, that the Commis58 Id. at 83, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
59 Ibid.
60 Id. at 84, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 505.

61 Id. at 85, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
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sioner has the power to regulate in this
area, 62 and such regulations are construed
as quasi-legislative. (These are to be distinguished from those pronouncements
which are quasi-judicial in character, and
therefore binding only on the litigant
parties.) The Commissioner of Education
has filed extensive regulations as to many
school matters but relevant to the matter
in issue it appears that he has provided only
for the maintenance of mental health records of children and that they are confidential except with the consent of the parent.
But "the regulations are silent on the right
of either the student or the parent to inspect the child's records. '63 Absent such
formal regulation, the court was reluctant
to find in these enactments a basis for
relief and so turned to the common law.
First the court referred to the common-law
64
rule, recognized in In the Matter of Egan,
to the effect that "when not detrimental to
the public interest, the right to inspect records of a public nature exists as to persons
who have sufficient interest in the subject
matter.... ",5 Secondly, Stenstrom v. Harnett,6 was quoted to the extent "that although a record was not strictly speaking
a public record, and although no statute
specified those who were or were not entitled to inspect it, the fact that the record
was required by law to be kept by a public
officer, entitled a person with an interest
62 See N. Y. CONST. art. V,

§ 4;

N. Y. EDUc. LAW

§ 305.
Van Allen v. McCleary, supra note 57, at 86,
211 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
64205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912).
65 Van Allen v. McCleary, supra note 57, at 91-92,
211 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
66 131 Misc. 75, 226 N.Y. Supp. 338 (Sup. Ct.
1927), all'd, 224 App. Div. 127, 230 N.Y. Supp.
28 (3d Dep't), aff'd mein., 249 N.Y. 606, 164
N.E. 602 (1928).
63

in it to inspect the record."'6 The court
found that all the factors which prompted
the court to issue a mandamus in that case
were present in the case at bar since it has
been held that members and officers of local
boards of education are public officers
within the definition of Section 2 of the
Public Officers Law. And as for a parent's
"interest" the court felt this was obvious.
On this concatenated reasoning the court
concluded that "absent constitutional, legislative or administrative permission or prohibition, a parent is entitled to inspect the
records of his child maintained by the
school authorities as required by law. The
68
petition is accordingly granted.
Of great interest in this case, are the
amicus curiae briefs submitted by the New
York State Psychological Association and
the New York State Teachers Association.
The court acknowledged with deep respect
the powerful arguments made concerning
the need for safeguards preventing misinterpretation by parents of records of a
highly professional and technical nature,
the desirability of preserving the professional freedom of expression of psychologists and other teachers, uninhibited by
fears of libel suits and parental retaliation,
and the dangers of affording the parents
material of a nature critical of the home
environment of the child. But, said the
court, these are matters essentially outside
the realm of judicial determination. "[I]t
is not th6 function of the court to write
regulations or enact statutes. In the final
analysis, the determination of these arguments rests either with the Legislature or
the Commissioner of Education to whom
Van Allen v. McCleary, supra note 57, at 92,
211 N.Y.S.2d at 512-13.
68 Id. at 93, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
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the Legislature has delegated broad power
to act."'69
Extension of Privilege?
The present status of social service
agencies- their social workers and case
records- is that they are subject to subpoena under the well-recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule.7 0 These exceptions include pedigree statements;71 declarations
against interest;7 2 admissions. 73 But with
the adoption of businesslike procedures,
and in particular, the maintenance of case
records, the exception to the hearsay rule
most frequently employed is commonly
known as "book entries made in the regular
course of business" which finds statutory
embodiment in Section 374-a of the New
York Civil Practice Act.7 4 This section has
69 Ibid.

For the benefit of the non-legally trained reader,
the hearsay rule excludes evidence, either written
or oral, of the existence of a fact based not on
the witness' own personal knowledge or observation but on what someone else said. See RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 206 (8th ed. Prince 1955).
71 That is, declarations concerning the history of
family descent which are transmitted from one
generation to another. Washington v. Bank of
Savings, 171 N.Y. 166, 63 N.E. 831 (1902);
Eisenlord v.Clum, 126 N.Y. 552, 27 N.E. 1024
87,
(1891). In Champion v.McCarthy, 228 Ill.
,81 N.E. 808, 811 (1907), the court noted the
general rule to be that declarations of deceased
members of the family of either the father or the
mother may be received to establish illegitimacy
as well as legitimacy.
72 That is, the declarations of a person since de70

ceased against his interests including other incidental and collateral facts and circumstances
contained therein. See Jefferson, Declarations
Against Interest: An Exception to the Hearsay
Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1944).
7 1 That is, statements made, or acts done, by one
of the parties prior to trial, concerning facts relevant to the present issues, which are inconsistent
with the propositions he now seeks to establish.
See Reed v. McCord, 160 N. Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737
(1899).
74 N. Y. Civ. PRAc.ACT § 374-a provides: "[A]ny
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been applied to render admissible the minute books and case books of a congregation; 75 baptismal records; 76 corporate
books, 77 death certificates; 7s the records of
an electroencephalograph test, 79 etc. Certain portions of these records are, however,
protected by other sections of the New
York Civil Practice Act. For example, section 352 provides that professional communications made by a physician and his
patient cannot be revealed without the
consent of the patient himself. This section,
whether applied to an oral communication
or one contained in a record, as in a
hospital record, protects such communication from compulsory disclosure.80 The
privilege of nondisclosure has also been
established by statute for the protection of
the communications between an attorney
and client, a clergyman and penitent, a
psychiatrist and client, and a husband and
in a book or otherwise,
made as a memorandum or record of an act,
transaction, occurrence or event, shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction,
occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find
that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it was the regular course of such
business to make such memorandum or record at
the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or
event, or within a reasonable time thereafter." In
addition, this statute defines "business" as including any business, profession, occupation or calling
of every kind.
writing or record ....

75 See Zinaman v. Stivelman, 246 App. Div. 851.
285 N.Y. Supp. 20 (2d Dep't), af'd, 272 N.Y,
580, 4 N.E.2d 813 (1936).
76 See Abbondola v. Church of St. Vincent dc
Paul, 205 Misc. 353, 123 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct
1953) (dictum).
77 See In the Matter of Estate of Auditore, 13(
Misc. 664, 240 N.Y. Supp. 502 (Surr. Ct. 1930)
78 See Duffy v. 42nd St. M. & St. N. Ave. Ry.
266 App. Div. 865, 42 N.Y.S.2d 534 (2d Dep'i
1943) (memorandum decision).
79 See Mayole v. B. Crystal & Son, Inc., 266 App
Div. 1008, 44 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2d Dep't 1943).
80 See Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 12
N.E.2d 417 (1955).
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wife. 81 These represent New York extensions of the privilege. Other jurisdictions, of
course, vary as to the number of professions covered and as to how far each
2
privilege goes.
All of the foregoing leads to the obvious
question, what about social work? Shall
it or shall it not be privileged and take its
place with the other great professions?
It is true that the social work profession
is a newcomer when compared with the
great traditions of the lawyer, the clergyman, etc. But newness per se was never a
criterion of truth or value. The old is good
and the new is good, but only on its own
merits. The writer as a priest of nearly
twenty years' experience, and as a member
of the bar, easily and honestly attests to the
fact that outside of the realm of the confessional - which is a totally different category of itself and sui generis - the priest or
lawyer is not in a more confidential relationship with clients or parishioners than
the social worker. People come to social
agencies, as they do to priests and lawyers,

81 See New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284
N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
82

Although the extension of the privilege is con-

tinuously being sought by many new professional

groups the policy in this area continues to be one
of strict limitation. Five states recognize a newspaperman-source of information privilege. See
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARiZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.
CODE

§

12-2237 (Supp. 1961); CAL. CIV. PROC.

§ 1881(6); N. J. REV. STAT. §2A:84A-21
(Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp.
1960).
Three states extend a privilege to the accountant-client relationship. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 153-1-7(b) (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-216
(1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12(E) (1953).
Three states recognize a psychologist-client
privilege. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1957);
GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1955); WASH. REV.
CODE § 18.83.110 (1957).

in times of great stress and often at the very
end of their emotional rope. Thereafter
nothing is so sacred, so intimate, so soulrevealing as the outpourings of the client.
The information is often not only. against
interest but outright incriminating, shaming
and searing. Surely, this is to be protected
in some way. Can the millions of clients
who are served annually be left in the precarious and uncertain position that perchance their trust will be betrayed? The
need for human warmth, guidance, counsel
and therapy is too great and too destructive
and the supply is too short. A solution must
be found.
The writer is in complete agreement with
the court in the Van Allen case that the
courts are not the proper forum for determination of this kind. 83 A piecemeal, mosaic-like solution leaves much to be desired.
Proper evaluation requires extensive presentation by expert witnesses, and many
practical judgments. This is the proper area
of the legislature with its unique facilities
for fact-finding, professional testimony, free
and open debate and evaluation. It can harness the energies and resources, skills and
experiences of a nation. The writer does
not dictate the answer, but an answer must
be found. "If the confidential relationship
[of social worker and client] were to be
stripped of its cloak of confidence, the relationship would become the most shocking
holocaust of human rights in the world at
84
the present time."

See McGuinn, The Professional Secret in Social Service Work 189 (unpublished doctoral dissertation in Fordham University, School of Social
83

Service Library) (1935).
84

McGuinn, op. cit. supra note 83, at 191.

